Wilder’s Hell Hounds(1)
17th Indiana Mounted Infantry Scouts and Their Henry Rifles
By: Todd R. Koster 2012©
Colonel John T. Wilder’s brigade and their Spencer rifles are ubiquitous in regards to the Tullahoma and Chickamauga Campaigns. And while much acclaim has been given to Wilder’s boys and the near mythological use of their Spencer rifles at Hoover's Gap, it would appear blasphemous to associate any other repeating rifle with his command. Especially when some believed that its primary competitor, the Henry rifle, was inferior and easily got out of repair.
The Army of the Cumberland’s camp at Murfreesboro, Tennessee provided the stage to the play that would unfold; where Wilder’s brigade would play a leading role. By early 1863 Maj. Gen. William Starke Rosecrans had grown weary of the deficiencies in regards to his mounted forces and his inability to dominate the field of battle when it came to the rebel cavalry. His solution was the creation of “light battalions” as prescribed in General Order No. 19. Rosecrans dated the order, that would form the “elite of the [his] army” into these light battalions, February 14; though he had already contacted the War Department the previous day. He proposed that these battalions would be formed with three privates from each company; along with one commissioned officer, two sergeants and three corporals from each regiment. Each battalion would be commanded by a field officer from within their own brigade. The selection process for the light battalions was rather straight forward. One would have had to “distinguish[ed] themselves by bravery in battle, by courage, [and] enterprise.” Rosecrans also desired the “best rifled arms, revolving arms, if possible, and [that the men] will be mounted as soon as practicable.” However, repeating rifles would have to suffice in lieu of the revolving arms.(2)
Two days later on February 16, and in the same spirit of the light battalions, Rosecrans issued Special Field Order No. 44; authorizing the mounting of Wilder’s brigade. Wilder wasted no time in the mobilization of his command and had already begun acquiring the necessary mounts and tack. One of his regiments, the 75th Indiana Infantry, chose to remain afoot and was subsequently transferred out of the brigade. Wilder's brigade of mounted infantry would now consist of the 17th and 72nd Indiana Infantry along with their Illini cousins of the 98th and 123rd Illinois Infantry. The void left by the 75th would be filled by the 92nd Illinois Infantry; in time for the summer campaign. Rounding out the brigade was the 18th Indiana Battery; with its compliment of artillery.(3)
The ink had hardly dried on General Order No. 19, when the War Department cited that Rosecrans’ light battalions were a violation of Congress. On February 19, they responded and informed him that his proposed organizational structure of volunteer troops and the selection of men from different regiments to form a single battalion was prohibited. Though it only took five days for the War Department to quash Rosecrans’ illegal battalions, it wasn’t until April 24, over two months later, before he shared their ruling with the rest of the army. It is unclear why Rosecrans dragged his feet on rescinding General Order No. 19. Was he hoping that it was easier to beg for forgiveness rather than ask for permission? Did he permit the War Department’s response to get lost in the bureaucratic shuffle at Murfreesboro, thus giving Wilder ample time to get his brigade established? In either case it did not matter because Wilder’s brigade would not be in violation, since his brigade maintained their regimental integrity.(4)
As the roads thawed and Wilder’s equine population grew, the search for the ideal arm heated up. February and March of 1863 saw Wilder's brigade in the midst of transformation. A portion of the brigade had been successfully mounted, which included the 17th and 72nd Indiana and the 98th Illinois. The 123rd Illinois was not yet mounted and the 92nd Illinois had not been transferred to the brigade. Wilder soon realized that the standard military long arms, Springfield and Austrian rifles, were too unwieldy for his newly mounted troops. He was determined to get a repeating rifle for his brigade.(5)
That February, Christopher Spencer toured the western armies marketing his aptly named Spencer rifle. In contrast, since the summer of 1862, the Henry rifle had been offered for sale by agents of the New Haven Arms Company. Several Henry rifle dealers had already been established throughout the Midwest. A relatively static army at Murfreesboro, an innovative command structure and the independent Midwestern mindset would provide the captive audience and catalyst that Christopher Spencer and Oliver Winchester desired. Spencer conducted demonstrations for Rosecrans and the army at Murfreesboro, whereas the Henry rifle had already been battle proven in Kentucky and Tennessee. Wilder had observed the Spencer demonstrations, but initially still chose to cast his lot with Winchester and his Henry rifle.(6)
On March 20, Wilder wrote the New Haven Arms Company in an attempt to secure 900 Henry rifles for his command. The 17th Indiana, considered “our most enterprising regiment,” according to Bugler Henry Campbell, of Capt. Eli Lilly’s 18th Indiana Battery; had already pledged their monthly wages of $13 to pay for the 16 shot Henry rifle. They, along with the rest of the brigade, would pay for their repeaters out of their own pocket. Due to limited manufacturing facilities, the New Haven Arms Company was unable to fill the order for the 900 Henrys. This however, would not be the end for the Henry rifle and Wilder's brigade. The brigade scouts of the 17th Indiana would eventually acquire their Henry rifles.(7)
A corps, or rather a company, of scouts was recruited from within each regiment of Wilder's brigade. They were similar in structure to Rosecrans’ light battalions, but on a smaller scale. Each scout company maintained their regimental designation. The regimental scout companies were constituted of picked men, one from each company. They were led by either a corporal or a sergeant. The brigade scouts, also made up of the highest caliber of men, were predominantly from Wilder's own 17th Indiana. They were led by Sgt. William L. Birney of Company E. The scouts, when acting on the brigade level, were occasionally accompanied by an officer. The brigade scouts opted to arm themselves with the Henry repeating rifle over the Spencer. Birney and his band of 25 scouts would make good use of their Henrys as they served far in advance of Wilder’s main force.(8)
The Henry rifle offered several advantages over the Spencer that would benefit the scouts. The Henry had twice the magazine capacity to that of the Spencer. Its magazine held fifteen or sixteen cartridges* plus one in the chamber as compared to seven plus one in the Spencer. The Henry possessed economy of motion; in that a single throw of the lever cocked the hammer and extracted a spent case. The return of the lever chambered a new cartridge. This allowed the scouts to maintain a consistent stock weld with their Henrys. The Spencer also chambered and extracted with the throw of its lever, but it required the soldier to perform an additional and separate act of cocking the hammer. As a result, he had to bring the Spencer from his shoulder; lose his sight alignment and target acquisition.(9)
April 1 found Birney leading seven of his scouts north on the Lebanon Pike with the brigade following. Though none of the brigade had received their Spencers yet, it is unknown whether Birney's scouts were armed with their Henrys at this time. Together they were scouring the surrounding farms for suitable mounts so that Wilder could complete the mounting of his command; while at the same time keep Rosecrans' rear areas clear of rebels. Birney and his scouts remained in the van for the day. On the following day they engaged a rebel company; capturing one, killing one and wounding several others without any loss to the scouts.(10)
Three weeks later, on April 21, the 17th Indiana scouts, again leading the advance, reached the rear of McMinnville at about 5 P.M. that evening. They captured a picket post and charged through town, alongside the 4th U.S. Cavalry, acting more the role of cavalry than that of mounted infantry. The rebel cavalry legend Brig. Gen. John Hunt Morgan was in McMinnville at the time and came close to being captured by the scouts, but he made good his escape. April drew to a close with the Army of the Cumberland still garrisoned in and around the environs of Murfreesboro.(11)
May brought new life to the Tennessee back country and along with it a new style of warfare. One of the earliest accounts of the 17th Indiana scouts being armed with Henry rifles is recorded in the diary of 21 year old Pvt. Henry W. Tutewiler of Company D. Tutewiler enlisted in the 17th on August 9, 1862 and served as Wilder’s aide from December 1862 through the end of September 1863. He kept a detailed account of his experiences with Wilder and the 17th. Tutewiler developed a strong bond with Wilder and the scouts and wrote often of “Burney [sic] and party.” He benefitted from his relationship with the scouts and Wilder because after one of their foraging forays, “the scouts brought in a little black stud horse which the colonel [Wilder] gave to me [Tutewiler].”(12)
The spring rains had arrived and May 6 proved to be a miserable day. The scouts and the brigade camped in the cold rain and mud around LaVergne, Tennessee. The weather continued with a cold drizzle that lasted all night and into the following day. Tutewiler recorded on May 7 that two parties of scouts, from the 17th and 72nd Indiana, had ventured out into the countryside. The roads had become a quagmire and the remainder of the brigade remained in camp, in an attempt to stay warm and dry. The scout company from the 72nd, still armed with their muzzle loading Springfields, was ambushed by a rebel party and at a disadvantage because of their arms. “The 17th Scouts were attacked by the same party but having Henry Rifles they repulsed them killing five and wounding others.”(13)
Friday May 15 found the brigade back in Murfreesboro. It was on this day that Christopher Spencer's February sales call paid off for both he and Wilder. The brigade was in receipt of 1,000 highly coveted Spencer rifles. They were divided amongst the regiments so that 300 were issued to each the 17th and 72nd Indiana and the 98th Illinois; with the remaining 100 rifles going to the 123rd Illinois. Each man was also issued 80 rounds of ammunition, with his Spencer.(14)
In the predawn hours of June 24; Wilder’s brigade, now armed with both Henry and Spencer rifles, rode southeast out of Murfreesboro on the Manchester Pike. Their objective, of what was to become the opening of the Tullahoma campaign, was Hoover’s Gap. They were the lead of Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas’ 14th Corps. Wilder's brigade was Thomas’ spear and Birney's scouts were the tip. Five companies of the 72nd Indiana took the advance, under the command of Lt. Col. Samuel C. Kirkpatrick of the 72nd, with “a party of 25 scouts, of the 17th and 72nd Indiana, as an extreme advance guard.” Seven miles out from Murfreesboro; Wilder's scouts made contact with the rebel pickets. The rebel picket posts were a mile from Big Spring Branch. The pickets opened fire on the brigade scouts, who returned fire with such alacrity as to push the rebels from their posts and into a cedar covered rise. The scouts and the five advance companies of the 72nd continued to push the rebels for another six miles to the southern end of Hoover's Gap at such a rate, owed to their repeaters and mounts, that the rebels were unable to occupy the fortifications that they had constructed at the gap's narrowest point. The assault continued and the rebels were pushed beyond their works and off the heights. Wilder, satisfied with the performance of his advance, posted his brigade on the heights overlooking McBride's Creek at the southern approach to the gap. The balance of the brigade arrived and began to deploy while the advance companies of the 72nd and brigade scouts continued on for another two miles, but were soon recalled. Worried about a flanking attack on his right, Wilder ordered four companies of the 17th to extend his line to the west and secure a high wooded hill. From there he wanted the them to deploy skirmishers onto some cleared hills on their front for observation and security.(15)
Private DeWitt Clinton Walters of Company I, who also served as one of the 17th Indiana scouts, referred to as both DeWitt and Clint in period accounts, advanced further into the brush with his Henry rifle. Walters went in search of the rebels that had fled from his seventeen shooter. He did not have long to wait. The counterattacking 4th Battalion Georgia Sharpshooters were already heading his way. Walters caught a glimpse of three butternut clad sharpshooters running through the Tennessee timber towards him, including Adjutant John R. Yourie of Major Theodore D. Caswell’s Battalion. “So impetuously did they come on, that they ran over De Witt [Walters], who saved himself by lying down beside a log and feigning to be dead.” The three sharpshooters continued past Walters and either failed to see him or fell victim to his ruse. Once Walters was sure that the rebels had placed enough distance between them and him, he sprang into action and worked the lever of his Henry. Firing into their rear, he killed the two sharpshooters and mortally wounded Yourie. Walters moved up, captured and brought him into the 17th’s lines. Yourie was not to survive for long and shortly thereafter succumbed to the wound from Walter’s Henry rifle.(16)
The morning of June 25 saw the lines settling and an exchange of shots amongst the skirmishers and pickets opened up. This gave an opportunity for the rest of the infantry to come down through the gap. The 33rd Ohio Infantry, of Colonel Benjamin F. Scribner’s brigade, 14th Corps had passed through the gap and relieved Wilder’s 17th and 72nd Indiana, on the right side of the Manchester Pike. The Ohioans took to these positions and the enemy opened on them with their artillery from the opposite hills and sharpshooters from the woods. Four Buckeyes were wounded by the rebels' rifle fire. One particularly ambitious but naïve rebel had elected to set up in a tree, from which he made himself a great annoyance within the union line. His elevated perch provided him an excellent observation platform, but because of the extreme range in which he posted himself, his fire caused no damage. The men of the 17th became annoyed with him, which prompted one of them to surreptitiously crawl to the front to close the distance between he and the treed sharpshooter. He needed to get the reb within his repeater’s effective range. “Seventeen bullets were hurled at him in vain; but at length one lucky ball hit him fairly, and with a savage yell he tumbled headlong from his perch to the ground.”(17)
Hoover’s Gap was secure and as result of the action, the Achilles’ heel of the repeating rifle was exposed and a prophecy fulfilled. The 17th Indiana had run out of ammunition. Fortunately for them they were within an easy ride back to Murfreesboro and Sgt. John T. Drury of Company E was sent back to retrieve additional cartridges.(18)
By June 26 the cartridge boxes of the 17th Indiana were now replenished and they, along with the rest of brigade, rode southeast to Manchester and then Decherd. Their purpose was to flank Tullahoma and convince the Army of Tennessee to leave their base. For the next eleven days Wilder’s boys skirmished with rebel garrisons, blew up trestle-work, burned commissary stores and destroyed track along the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad. The troopers’ actions did not go without notice. Rebel forces began to concentrate and gave pursuit, which prompted Wilder to use discretion; head north to Pelham and return to Manchester.(19)
The curtain was closed on the Tullahoma Campaign on the fourth of July. Wilder’s ride in Gen. Braxton Bragg’s rear caused the rebel commander great concern. Bragg’s rail line to Chattanooga had been severed at Decherd. This, combined with the advancing pressure of Rosecrans’ army on his front caused the Army of Tennessee to fall back towards Bridgeport, Alabama and eventually to their fortifications at Chattanooga.(20)
Chattanooga, the “Gateway” to the south, appeared in the valley below. This sight greeted Campbell on August 21 as he and the rest of the brigade crested Stringer’s Ridge. Earlier that morning, “the scouts [had] dashed over the hill, down the banks of the river, and captured a lot of rebels that were endeavoring to cross the river in a horse ferryboat.” The south side of the Tennessee River bristled with rebel forts and guns, but they were no deterrent to the 17th Indiana scouts. Only two days later, Henry Tutewiler, Clint Walters and Captain William A. Owens of Company D felt secure enough on their side of the river to go “down the river to the front of the island, to the house of Mr. Williamson where we got our dinner and some nice peaches.”(21)
For the next couple of weeks, the brigade was stalled on the northern bank of the Tennessee River while the rebels held the opposite. Though the Tennessee separated the two armies; the nights were not without lively action of suspect gunfire. On August 26 and September 5, Tutewiler and Campbell recorded respectively two such alarms. The first night a trooper had placed his saddle too close to the fire. As result a hole had “burned through the pocket and let the cartridges drop, one after another causing the alarm.” The second incident was reported to be a “volley” which was caused by a cartridge box belonging to of one of the “17th boys.” He had hung it too close to the fire, which caused the copper cartridges to heat up and go “off like a small volley of musketry.”(22)
The time for the proper use of the repeaters’ metallic cartridges was at hand and for Wilder to cross the Tennessee. The 17th Indiana scouts moved up river, opposite Friar’s Island, and made preparations to cross. Friar’s Island sat in the Tennessee approximately eight miles above Chattanooga and at the mouth of North Chickamauga Creek. It was approximately 450 by 100 yards and provided a natural point of cover for any troops attempting to cross the Tennessee. The scouts were to secure the island and persuade the rebel artillerymen on the southern bank to leave. On the morning of September 8 the scouts swam the Tennessee to take the island. The rebels shelled Friar’s Island heavily to keep the scouts off, but to no avail. The island was secured for the Union, with the loss of a single scout, but not from rebel iron. Private Joseph C. Wilson of Company A “took the cramp and drowned.” By that evening three companies of the 17th were on the island. The rebels continued the shelling with no effect. The following day they had abandoned their works along with Chattanooga itself.(23)
Chattanooga was in Union hands on September 9 but the scouts and the brigade were not to remain there for long. They crossed the Tennessee and headed south along the Western & Atlantic Railroad towards Ringgold, Georgia. The gray tide ebbed further south for the next couple of days until, on the 11th, the rebel cavalry, of Col. John S. Scott’s brigade, were posted in strength on the road approximately two miles from Ringgold. Wilder’s men skirmished with the rebs and drove them from their position all the way to Tunnel Hill, where another line of rebel cavalry was waiting for them. This line had been reinforced and was now under the command of Brig. Gen. Nathan Bedford Forrest. His line too was pushed south but eventually held four miles from Dalton. Forrest suffered considerable casualties including him. By evening, Wilder’s brigade occupied Tunnel Hill and bivouacked in line of battle for the night. Wilder received orders, later that night, from Maj. Gen. Thomas L. Crittenden to return to Ringgold at daylight.(24)
Early on September 12, Wilder’s brigade was back in the saddle and en route to La Fayette, Georgia; to rendezvous with Maj. Gen. Joseph J. Reynolds. Their chosen path took them near Leet’s Tan-yard where they encountered a rebel blocking force four miles outside of Ringgold. About a mile from Rock Springs, the 17th Indiana scouts were detached and sent to gain the rear of the rebel pickets on the road. Tutewiler recorded that “our advance ran into a large force of the rebs - the 17th scouts were almost entirely surrounded.” The fight became increasingly desperate. “One reb knocked Clint Walters off of his horse and then stuck a revolver at his head demanding his surrender. Clint answered him by knocking him down with his gun. A lieutenant surrendered to Burney [sic] and afterward tried to kill him for which William [Birney] did kindness. Burney [sic] killed him.” Wilder heard the report of gunfire and sent the balance of the 17th up to support the scouts while the 72nd formed on their left.(25)
The scouts had ridden into a hornet’s nest of the 6th Georgia Cavalry and Rucker’s Legion, of Brig. Gen. John Pegram’s command. The fighting lasted for two hours and “was almost literally hand to hand,” Pegram reported.(26)
The brethren Hoosiers of the 17th and 72nd Indiana moved up to assist the scouts; who were at the same moment in danger of becoming surrounded by the encircling rebel cavalry. The engagement would come to be known as the Battle of Rock Springs. Pvt. William B. Summany of Company E, 17th Indiana, was wounded, captured and supposed dead. Pvt. Jackson Denny of Company F, 17th Indiana, was mortally wounded and died on September 16. Tutewiler further recorded the supposed loss of his friend Walters. “…A large column of dust moving around to our right looked suspicious. Clint [Walters], on the supposition that they were our troops, went across to report and as they proved to be rebs and Clint has not been heard from, we fear he was either killed or captured.”(27)
Pegram’s troopers were unable to complete the encirclement of the 17th Indiana scouts. The scouts and the brigade had slipped from the rebels’ snare. Pegram excused his cavalry’s performance and placed cause with their small force and with “this unequal conflict with the picked brigade of General Crittenden’s corps.” There is little doubt that the repeating rifles played a significant role in the breakout. Pegram reported his rebel losses at Rock Springs at 50 killed and wounded.(28)
As Wilder’s brigade continued west; they realized the dire straits that they were in. Although he had disengaged from Pegram, Wilder’s right was now threatened by Brig. Gen. Otho F. Strahl’s brigade of infantry. More importantly, Strahl’s Tennesseans blocked Wilder’s path to Crittenden at Lee and Gordon’s Mill. Wilder charged into Strahl’s command, drove his left flank and opened the road to Napier’s Gap and Crittenden. On September 14, the brigade rendezvoused with Reynolds near Catlett’s Gap. It was now clear that the Army of Tennessee was turning to fight. Three days later on the 17th, Wilder’s brigade was ordered to picket and hold Alexander’s bridge; a dilapidated wooden structure over Chickamauga Creek. Unbeknownst to them, on the following day and at this bridge, they would be witness to the opening shots of the battle that would bear the creek’s name; Chickamauga.(29)
William Birney and Henry Tutewiler survived Chickamauga and the war. Birney continued to lead the brigade scouts and was eventually promoted to captain. He mustered out as a lieutenant on February 2, 1865. Tutewiler, ever the faithful aide, accompanied the ailing Wilder back to Indiana after Chickamauga. Tutewiler returned to the 17th Indiana and was promoted to quartermaster sergeant in March of 1864 and regimental quartermaster the following fall. He mustered out on July 5, 1865. De Witt Clinton Walters survived his reconnaissance ride at Rock Springs. He reappeared on December 13, 1863 in the 123rd Indiana Infantry as captain of Company B. He finished the war as the 123rd’s lieutenant colonel.(30)
The 1863 campaigns of the Army of the Cumberland benefitted from the repeating rifles of the Hoosiers and Suckers in Wilder’s brigade. Their volume of fire contributed to the success of the brigade in Tennessee and northern Georgia and it was within the ranks of the 17th Indiana that the Henry rifle served alongside the Spencer. The Henrys were all private purchases and it is difficult to determine the exact number of them used by the 17th. Ordnance returns and quartermaster records fail to shed any light on the subject matter.
The 17th Indiana returned home, the following January, for their 30 day re-enlistment furlough. On the 25th, the regiment disembarked from the steamboat Havana and onto their native soil at Evansville. The Evansville Journal reported, on January 26, 1864, that the ranks of the 17th were 527 strong, “and at their own expense have armed half the regiment with the Spencer rifles, the best in the service, and the only one the rebels have not been able to imitate. The balance of the regiment is armed with the Henry rifle, making this regiment the most formidable in the service.” It is unlikely that half of the regiment was armed with Henrys, but the myriad of them made an impression with the onlookers and reporter at the landing that day. The number of Henry rifles must have extended beyond the scout company. Two months later, Frese & Kropf, an Indianapolis hardware store that capitalized on the 17th and their Henrys, ran an advertisement in the Indianapolis Daily Journal. The listing read, “The ‘Henry Rifle’ – This celebrated sixteen-shot Repeater, now used by the 17th Indiana, with which this gallant regiment under the world-renowned Col. Wilder has accomplished such great feats, is now on exhibition and for sale.”(31)
Twenty years after the Tullahoma Campaign; the exploits of 17th Indiana’s scouts and their Henry rifles still lingered in the memories of at least one Hoosier veteran. Sgt. William H. H. Benefiel of company G, 17th Indiana Mounted Infantry, inquired in the National Tribune in 1883 and wondered if anyone has heard from “Sgt. Burney [sic] and his twenty-five daring scouts armed with the Henry rifle?”(32)
Bresnan, Andrew L. “Additional Information on the Henry Repeating Rifle.” The Henry Repeating Rifle, September 2005. Web. October 18, 2012, www.44henryrifle.webs.com
Campbell Henry, “Three Years in the Saddle: Journal of Events, Facts and Incidents connected with the 18th Indiana Battery,” Robert T. Ramsay Jr. Archival Center, Lilly Library, Wabash College, Crawfordsville, Indiana.
Indiana Commission for the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park. Indiana at Chickamauga, 1863-1900. Report of the Indiana Commissioners, Chickamauga National Military Park. Indianapolis: Sentinel Printing Co., 1900.
Indianapolis Daily Journal.
National Tribune, Washington D.C.: G.E. Lemon & Co., 1877-1917.
New Haven Arms Company: Henry’s Repeating Rifle, New Haven, CT: T. J. Stafford, 1865.
Terrell, William H. H., Report of the Adjutant General of the State of Indiana, 8 volumes, Indianapolis: W.R. Holloway-State Printer, 1865-1868.
Tutewiler, Henry W. (17th Indiana) Diary August 29th 1862 – September 25th 1863, Janie and Larry Darling private collection, Brookston, Indiana.
United States War Department, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 70 volumes in 128 parts (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1880-1901).
Sources and Notes:
Wilder’s Hell Hounds was a sobriquet purportedly bestowed by Brig Gen Nathan Bedford Forest after Chickamauga.
The Henry rifle had been in service with Lt. Col. Gabriel Netter’s 15th Kentucky Cavalry (USA) prior to September 19, 1862 and by Capt. James M. Wilson of Company M, 12th Kentucky Cavalry (USA) prior to December 31, 1862. The confederate 10th Kentucky Partisan Rangers had a company armed with Henry rifles at the surrender of Clarksville, Kentucky on August 18, 1862.
The original account in the Cincinnati Gazette lists Adjutant Yource, of the 3rd Battalion Georgia Sharpshooters. There is no Adjutant Yource listed on the roster of the 3rd which served in the Army of Northern Virginia. The 4th Battalion Georgia Sharpshooters originated from the formation of the 3rd Georgia Sharpshooters and the surplus became the 4th Battalion on May 4, 1863. The 4th Battalion Georgia Sharpshooters served in the Army of Tennessee. Adjutant John R. Yourie was listed amongst the killed at Hoover’s Gap with the 4th Battalion.